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Abstract 
Unlike social judgments, perceptual judgments are anchored in concrete 
reality and should not depend on social context. However, recent research 
suggests that perceptions of physical space can depend on social and emo-
tional considerations. In contrast to theoretical approaches that view visual 
perception as a low-level process that is entirely independent of situational 
constraints, many studies support the notion that visual perception takes 
place in an “embodied” fashion, because people perceive the physical 
world around them as a function of how they would act in that world. This 
chapter reviews the influence of social and emotional factors in research 
involving maps and other conceptual representations of space, and in re-
search involving the perception of distances and inclines. The reviewed 
findings provide a glimpse of how social factors influence basic cognitive 
processes previously assumed to be insulated from such influences.  
1. Introduction 
We speak of A as a ‘close’ friend, B as a ‘distant’ sort of person. We keep C at 
‘arm’s length,’ consider E ‘aloof ’ or ‘withdrawn,’ F as ‘pushy’ and with some 
scientific rigor characterize interpersonal relationships in terms of ‘social dis-
tance.’ (Little, 1965, p. 238, emphasis added). 
Metaphors describing social relationships in terms of distance are plentiful 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 1999). These metaphors are not arbitrary: People 
use space in specific ways as a function of social relationships, as shown by 
Proxemics, the study of personal space (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Hall, 1968; 
Hayduk, 1983). For example, people maintain less distance when they feel 
“close” to somebody (Patterson, 1977; Willis, 1966), whereas they main-
————— 
1 Preparation of this paper was supported by NSF grant BCS 0518835 and 
ESRC First Grant RES-061-25-0119. Thanks to the Department of Psychology 
at Harvard University for accommodating the author as a Visiting Scholar dur-
ing the Spring of 2009 when this paper was prepared. 
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tain more distance when the other person is disliked, or carries a physical 
stigma (Kleck, 1968). Further, people maintain an area of personal space 
around them that is usually not violated by others (Hall, 1968). Thus, social 
factors often influence how people interact in physical space. Further, re-
cent research has explored the extent to which perceived distance expands 
or contracts depending on how “close” or “distant” a social relationship is. 
This chapter will illustrate how social distance is related to perceived dis-
tance, and more generally, how social and affective factors influence per-
ception of physical space.  
In line with the claim that cognitive processes are embodied and action-
driven, spatial perception appears to be constrained by a person’s potential 
to carry out specific actions in a given environment. Recent work by Prof-
fitt and colleagues supports the idea that functional aspects play a critical 
role in perception. For example, the perception of slants of hills and of dis-
tances is influenced by factors such as whether the perceiver is wearing 
a heavy backpack (Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003), is young 
or old (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), is fatigued (Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & 
Midgett, 1995), or has action goals in mind (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 
2004). Such factors influence perception because they are relevant to ac-
tion. For instance, a distance is harder to traverse for an elderly, or a fa-
tigued person, and thus, appears as farther. These studies suggest that visual 
perception combines aspects of the perceiver with the environment to be 
perceived. Of primary concern is what Proffitt (2006) calls the economy of 
action. In order to plan and to manage one’s physical and mental resources 
to cope with the world, humans, and indeed all organisms, scale the world 
in terms of the actions that are afforded by their bodies. According to this 
view, visual perception provides a mechanism to indicate whether exerting 
a certain amount of energy is worthwhile, given the potential energetic 
costs and current resources available: Plans for action are related to their 
energetic costs, and people are informed about these contingencies through 
their visual perception, because it reflects, given the current state of the 
body, how difficult and costly it would be to perform a given action in the 
environment.  
With respect to the two important geometric and psychological parame-
ters that have been studied – slant and extent – it can be argued that social 
resources may inform perception of the world no less crucially than does 
the availability of our physical energy. Just as steep hills and great distanc-
es require that physical energy be available, they may also require emotion-
al and social resources. The larger idea is that our perception of the physi-
cal world, as well as of psychological situations, is constrained by 
emotional and social factors. All these influences constrain perception, 
because they are concerned with goals, plans, and resource decisions, or 
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more generally, the anticipation of action. It is because of this motivation to 
take action that functional demands of a situation make a person literally 
look at the world differently.  
To some extent perceptual estimates of the physical world, namely es-
timates of distances and of hill slant, might be similar to the kinds of 
judgments studied by social psychologists, such as ratings of life satisfac-
tion, probability, risk, and so on. The latter kinds of judgments are charac-
terized by two aspects: First, they are “subjective.” For example, the same 
circumstances can result in high ratings of life satisfaction for one person, 
but low ratings of life satisfaction for another person. Second, judgments 
depend on various properties of the context in which the judgments are 
made. Such contextual factors include the framing of the question (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981), the mood of the person being questioned (e.g., 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schnall, Haidt, Clore & Jordan, 2008), currently 
accessible cognitive concepts (e.g., Schnall, Benton & Harvey, 2008), and 
so on. Perceptual estimates may share these two aspects of judgments, and 
are sensitive to the demands of a given context. However, perceptual esti-
mates differ in one important way from other judgments: They can be 
more or less accurate. In contrast to judgments of liking, life satisfaction, 
moral integrity, etc., there is a correct answer when it comes to perceptions 
of the real world: A 12 cm long line on a piece of paper, such as a map, 
simply is 12 cm long.  
In this chapter research concerning small-scale distance estimates on 
maps and other visual media will be reviewed first, and how recent work in 
this domain has started to incorporate social and emotional considerations 
of the perceiver. Following this, recent developments in cognitive science 
related to embodied cognition will be discussed. Then research on embod-
ied perception, involving perceptual estimates in the physical environment 
such as perceptions of hill slant and of distance will be reviewed. The next 
section will discuss how social and emotional factors inform spatial percep-
tion, and parallels between physiological and social resources will be ex-
plored. Finally, similarities of subjective and objective judgments within 
cognitive and social psychology will be considered.  
2. Physical and psychological maps 
In order to move around in the world individuals need to have an internal 
representation of the environment to consult for navigation. However, cog-
nitive distance, defined as the spatial component of an individual’s repre-
sentations of the environment, differs from actual, or physical distance 
(Golledge, 1987), and can be changed by structural properties of space 
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(Tversky, 2000). For example, people appear to divide the environment into 
meaningful categories (“chunks”) which subsequently influence spatial 
judgments, leading to distortions when estimating distances on maps and 
other visual media. For example, Thorndyke (1981) had participants study 
maps with city names, and then estimate the distance between pairs of cit-
ies. The greater the number of intervening cities between two target cities, 
the greater was the estimated distance between those two cities. In addition, 
distances between stimuli that are considered part of a perceptual Gestalt 
are underestimated compared to stimuli that are outside of that Gestalt 
(Coren & Girgus, 1980). Thus, when crossing over a boundary, whether 
physical or conceptual, subjective distance estimates increase. 
Additional research has investigated whether subjective psychological 
feelings associated with crossed borders might also change distance esti-
mates. Indeed, attitudes related to in-groups and out-groups have been 
shown to influence distance estimates in recent studies (Kerkman, Stea, 
Norris, & Rice, 2004; Burris & Branscombe, 2005). For instance, Burris 
and Branscombe (2005) asked university students from Memphis, Tennes-
see, and Lawrence, Kansas, to estimate distances between cities on a map 
of the United States. Participants overestimated the distances between 
a U.S. location and a foreign location relative to a visually equidistant U.S. 
location. Of primary interest was that this overestimation took place only 
when the distance estimates involved crossing the U.S. border to a foreign 
country such as Canada or Mexico, but not when it involved crossing bor-
ders between two foreign locations. Burris and Branscombe (2005) inter-
preted their data as suggesting the effect a “psychological boundary” be-
tween relevant space to oneself and one’s ingroup, namely one’s own 
country, and nonself-relevant space, namely other countries. Similarly, 
Carbon and Leder (2005) showed self involvement as a potential factor for 
a bias in distance estimation across borders of countries. They found that 
distances between city pairs that involved crossing the former “Iron Cur-
tain”, with one city in East Germany, and the other city in West Germany, 
were systematically overestimated compared to distances of cities located 
within the same parts of Germany. Interestingly, this overestimation of 
distances between regions was especially pronounced for participants who 
exhibited a negative attitude toward the reunification of Germany. 
Bugmann and Schnall (2009) recently showed that experimentally in-
duced negative emotions can also change estimates of distances between 
cities on a map. Because disgust is considered to be evolutionarily signifi-
cant in protecting one’s physical boundaries (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley & 
Imada, 1997), Bugmann and Schnall (2009) manipulated disgust by having 
participants fill out the Disgust Sensitivity Scale (Haidt, McCauley & 
Rozin, 1994), which involves considering a variety of potentially disgust-
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ing situations. After being induced to feel disgust participants systematical-
ly gave higher distance estimates between city pairs than participants who 
were in a neutral emotional state. This finding suggests that incidental feel-
ing of disgust can establish a psychological boundary involving a desire to 
remove oneself from an unpleasant source of affect, and as a consequence 
influences cognitive distance even when the disgust is not relevant to the 
current situation.  
Several recent studies demonstrated that metacognitive factors, such as 
processing fluency and primed perceptual anchors can change distance es-
timates. Alter and Oppenheimer (2008) asked participants to consider dis-
tances between cities as they were waiting at a train station in New Jersey, 
and estimated distances to a variety of US cities from their current location. 
Some of the participants received the questionnaire printed in a font that 
was easy to read, thus involving a metacognitive state of perceptual fluency 
(e.g., Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003), whereas other 
participants received font that was difficult to read, thus involving perceptu-
al disfluency. When reading the questionnaire was difficult and required 
effort, participants gave higher distance estimates between the cities than 
when reading the questionnaire did not require effort. Presumably, the dis-
fluency experienced when reading the item was interpreted to indicate that 
distances between the cities must be far.  
LeBoef and Shafir (2006) asked participants to draw a 3.5 inches long 
line on a sheet of paper. Half of the participants started with a very short 
line and had to complete it to make it the required length, whereas the other 
half of them started with a long line and had to shorten it. Those extending 
the previously given short line drew significantly shorter lines than those 
shortening the given long line, suggesting that whatever anchor a partici-
pant started with determined how long they perceived 3.5 inches to be.  
All these findings suggest that rather than being objectively determined 
by a low-level modular process (Fodor, 1983), visual processes such as 
estimating small-scale distances on maps are constrained by various con-
textual factors, which can include mood, processing fluency, and cognitive 
anchors. The work reviewed above concerned spatial estimates that in-
volved representations of space in the form of maps, or lines on paper. 
Other research has investigated contextual influences on the perception of 
physical space to which observers are directly exposed; for example, par-
ticipants might stand at the bottom of a hill and estimate its slant, or stand 
in a grassy field and estimate distance to specific targets. Such direct per-
ceptual estimates of physical space are also constrained by contextual 
factors, which is in line with one of the central tenet of theories of embod-
ied cognition that have become prominent in recent years, as will be re-
viewed next.  
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3. Embodied cognition 
Following researchers in other areas of cognitive science (e.g., Barsalou, 
1999; Clark, 1997; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 1999; Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch, 1991), social psychologists have started to emphasize 
the benefits of an embodied view of cognition, based on the notion that 
functioning in the world with bodies fundamentally shapes cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber& Ric, 2005; 
Smith & Semin, 2004). As in other disciplines, the new focus on embodi-
ment has generated enthusiasm and renewed interest in physical aspects of 
affective experience. 
One of the main assumptions of embodied cognition2 is that ultimately, 
the goal of cognitive processes is not to produce mental representations of 
abstract knowledge, but instead, to facilitate appropriate action in the 
world. The kinds of actions that are possible, and therefore, the kinds of 
cognitive structures that follow, are constrained by stable as well as tempo-
rary characteristics of the human body. This view is not entirely new (e.g., 
Gibson, 1979; Merleau-Ponty, 1962); however, traditionally psychologists 
have tended to treat cognition as taking place entirely “in the head”, and the 
role of the body has been largely underappreciated (for a history of the 
disembodied mind, see Johnson, 1987; Spellman & Schnall, in press). To 
appreciate the excitement following this new perspective, it needs to be 
clarified what embodiment refers to. The term embodiment has been used 
by researchers in cognitive science in multiple ways, sometimes without 
being defined explicitly (Anderson, 2003; Wilson, 2002). Often it has been 
defined not so much by what it is, but by what it is not. For example, it has 
been noted that the goal of cognitive processes is not simply thinking. Re-
searchers endorsing the embodied approach to cognition have put their 
perspective in opposition to the assumptions of more traditional approaches 
to cognition (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). These research 
traditions, which have been termed objectivist (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) or 
cognitivist (Clark, 1997; Varela et al., 1991), make very specific claims 
————— 
2 For purposes of simplification, the term “embodied cognition” is used to refer 
to a cluster of theoretical approaches that share, among other things, a com-
mitment to the physicality of human cognition. It is acknowledged, as cau-
tioned by Barsalou (2008), that the embodied component of such approaches is 
but one aspect, which downplays the fact that other aspects are necessary and 
equally important. As a more appropriate and inclusive term Barsalou (2008) 
suggests “grounded cognition.” However, because the term “embodied cogni-
tion” has become popular, especially within social psychology, this term was 
chosen for discussion in the present paper. 
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about the nature, and the purpose of internal representations. The issue is, 
to use an often quoted example, how human beings represent the fact that 
chairs have four legs, a seat, a back, possibly some armrests, and so on. Do 
people indeed represent objects, ideas, and situations in the form of features 
or propositions? Traditional theories assume that amodal symbols and 
properties define conceptual structure, and that cognitive processes corre-
spond to the manipulation of those symbols (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Fodor & 
Pylyshyn, 1988). The symbols themselves are arbitrary, and are given 
meaning only by means of how they are combined. This computational 
metaphor in cognitive science has been influential ever since the cognitive 
revolution. 
In contrast to traditional theories of cognition, according to the embod-
ied approach, the brain evolved not to provide an accurate mirror represen-
tation of the world, but rather, to help humans, and non-human animals 
alike, to successfully act in the world. Because the goal of mental represen-
tations is to allow for actions and interactions with the world, representa-
tions are the result of interactions with the environment, rather than consist-
ing of arbitrary abstract symbols (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997). Such 
embodied representations maintain the modality of perceptual experience, 
and concepts are considered to involve simulations of such perceptual pro-
cesses (Barsalou, 1999).  
This general claim is in part based on the notion of affordance, coined 
by Gibson (1979), which describes potential interactions between a person 
and an object, or an environment. Certain actions are “afforded” by certain 
objects, whereas others are not: A chair affords sitting on it, but normally 
does not afford walking on it. However, affordances are not fixed, but de-
pend on specific circumstances. One can easily imagine situations where a 
chair will not afford sitting, for example, if it is a miniature model in a doll 
house. Similarly, one can imagine situations in which a chair will afford 
walking on it, for example when a series of chairs forms a walkable trail 
out of a flooded house. A critical implication of cognition in the service of 
action is that specific actions happen in specific contexts. 
Importantly, context or situational factors do not simply modify what 
action, and thus, what cognitive process is appropriate, but rather, they 
define the action. Consider the example of the frog’s visual system (Ingle, 
1973). Frogs have several neurologically separate visual pathways, such as 
one pathway to detect prey, another to monitor predators, and yet another to 
control visually guided locomotion. Thus, frogs do not have a general-
purpose visual system that responds differently depending on what input it 
receives; rather, the input (e.g., prey vs. predator), and the corresponding 
action associated with the input (catching a fly vs. escaping from a hawk) 
determines the process of visual perception. The goal of vision is not to see, 
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but to control movements as a response to stimuli in the environment 
(Milner & Goodale, 1995). By rejecting the notion of “pure” vision (Marr, 
1982), or more generally, the notion that perceptual processes are informa-
tionally encapsulated (Fodor, 1983) and independent of higher-level cogni-
tive processes, embodied cognition approaches have provided a productive 
way of studying the interactions of vision and action (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 
1998). One domain of perception for which the embodied view of cognitive 
processes has become especially relevant is the perception of the physical 
environment, including distances and slants of hills, as will be reviewed 
next.  
4. Embodied perception: Physiological resources 
Judging from their everyday experiences people assume that their visual 
perceptions accurately reflect the physical world around them. In contrast, 
inspired by Gibson’s (1979) notion of affordance a view of perception 
based on the economy of action (Proffitt, 2006) proposes that people per-
ceive the space around them relative to how they can act on it. For exam-
ple, when exhausted due to a long and strenuous run people perceive hills 
as steeper than when they are not fatigued (Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & 
Midgett, 1995). Similarly, people who wear heavy backpacks perceive hills 
to be steeper than do people who are unencumbered (Bhalla & Proffitt, 
1999). Such studies have demonstrated an association between spatial per-
ception and factors that are relevant to action: Because climbing a hill is 
challenging for fatigued or encumbered people, they perceive it be to steep-
er. Thus, people’s perception of the physical world is not simply a function 
of objective features of the environment such as slant or extent, but is con-
strained by the perceiver’s ability to act on that given space, at a given 
time. Evidence for the economy of action involved in making perceptual 
estimates has come from two sources: Studies involving hill slant, and stud-
ies involving distance. These will be reviewed in turn.  
4.1. Visual slant perception 
Various accounts of visual perception propose two distinct functions of vi-
sion that appear to be controlled by two anatomically separate visual path-
ways in the brain (e.g., Milner & Goodale, 1995). The two visual processes 
relate to action planning and action execution, which are thought to be con-
trolled by the ventral stream, and the dorsal stream of the visual cortex. Stud-
ies assessing the perception of hill slants have documented that people give 
Embodi
differen
tion of 
Schnall
involve
grees, a
which 
The ver
and on 
exampl
hill to b
tions th
encumb
In 
slant, w
adjuste
Figure 
further,
whethe
exercis
challen
steep o
perceiv
Figure 1
ment in Affect
t estimates d
vision, or t
 et al., 2008
s first, havin
nd second, 
involves adj
bal and visu
these measu
e, research p
e 30°. Such 
at would ma
ered, or fati
contrast, act
hich involve
d, without s
1). This vis
 is not cha
r the person
e (Bhalla & P
ging to asce
n the verbal 
e it when usi
. Participant
ive Space
epending on
he other (Bh
): Action pl
g the partici
by asking th
usting a disk
al measures
re people ten
articipants t
overestimati
ke it difficu
gued, as note
ion executio
s placing th
ight of the h
ually-guided
nged by ma
 wears a hea
roffitt, 1999
nd a hill le
and visual m
ng the hapti
 using haptic 
 whether a s
alla & Pro
anning is ca
pant state th
e participan
 to represen
 assess peop
d to dramati
ypically esti
on is amplif
lt for a pers
d earlier.  
n is captur
e dominant h
and, to be p
 action mea
nipulations
vy backpac
). In other w
ad participan
easures, bu
c measure. H
measure to as
lant measur
ffitt, 1999; P
ptured by a
e slant of a h
t to engage
ts the cross
le’s explicit
cally overes
mate a 5° hil
ied with exp
on to climb
ed by a hap
and on a pa
arallel to th
sure is gen
of physiolo
k or is fatigu
ords, factor
ts to estima
t do not cha
ow can this
sess hill slant
e taps into on
roffitt et al
verbal estim
ill in geome
in visual ma
-section of t
 awareness o
timate hill sl
l to be 20°, o
erimental ma
a hill, such a
tic measure
lmboard tha
e hill’s incli
erally accur
gical state 
ed due to p
s that would 
te the hill a
nge how ste
apparent dis
 
. 
139 
e func-
., 1995; 
ate that 
tric de-
tching, 
he hill. 
f slant, 
ant. For 
r a 10° 
nipula-
s being 
 of hill 
t can be 
ne (see 
ate and 
such as 
revious 
make it 
s more 
ep they 
connect 
140 Simone Schnall 
between the two types of measures be explained? Importantly, the haptic 
palmboard measure is assessed by asking participants to place their hand on 
the palmboard without looking, and adjust it to be equivalent to the inclina-
tion of the hill in front of them. Therefore, there is no visual feedback when 
performing this task. In contrast, the explicit verbal and visual reports are 
made by explicitly deciding on the magnitude of hill slant. Thus, one way of 
thinking of this distinction is to consider the verbal and visual measures as 
accessible to explicit awareness because they are guided by deliberate ma-
nipulation of the measures, and allow the participant to adjust the measure 
while at the same time looking at the hill, whereas control of the haptic 
measure relies on visuomotor processes that are not entirely open to con-
scious consideration (see Witt & Proffitt, 2007, for a detailed discussion). 
The overestimation in the measures that relate to action planning is 
adaptive and is driven by two separate mechanisms (Proffitt, 2006). First, 
response compression allows for greater sensitivity to small changes in 
slant for relatively shallow slants, which are the only slants one can walk 
on and therefore the only slants for which small differences are of any rele-
vance (see Proffitt, 2006, for further detail). Second, because these repre-
sentations inform decisions about action that need to take into account costs 
and benefits, anticipating what would be involved in ascending the hill, 
what resources would be required, and what resources are available and 
including this information in explicit perception is adaptive in terms of 
influencing individuals to be cautious and “on the safe side” when planning 
future action and energy expenditure. In contrast, for actual navigation and 
movement within the environment the body needs to act precisely in line 
with the conditions of the environment: When ascending a steep hill a per-
son needs to lift the foot such that it perfectly accommodates the ground 
upon which it will be placed and thus factors related to action planning are 
relatively irrelevant. 
Using these convergent measures for which different results are ex-
pected has the benefit that effects due to experimental demand characteris-
tics are unlikely, because in that case all measures should show the same 
pattern of results, which they do not.  
4.2. Visual distance perception 
Inspired by the initial finding that hills appear steeper when observers wear a 
heavy backpack relative to when they do not (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), fol-
low-up studies tested whether similar effects could be obtained when en-
cumbered observers estimate distance to walkable targets ranging from 1 to 
17 meters (Proffitt et al., 2003). In one study, participant stood in a grassy 
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field and estimated how far from them orange traffic cones were that had 
been placed at varying distances.3 Indeed, participants wearing a heavy 
backpack estimated the distances to be farther than those who were not, 
which is consistent with the idea that on some level, perceivers took into 
account how effortful it would be to walk to specific targets given their cur-
rent physical state.4 Other research had participants throw a heavy or a light 
ball at targets before estimating the distance to those targets. After throwing 
a heavy ball participants indicated that distance to the targets was farther 
than after throwing a light ball (Witt, Proffitt & Epstein, 2004). Presumably, 
perceived effort when carrying out a specific action, in this case throwing 
a ball, was interpreted as being diagnostic of the distance to the object relat-
ing to that action.  
Considerations of how easy or difficult it is to reach a target also influ-
ence estimates of distances to closer targets. Witt, Proffitt and Epstein 
(2005) presented participants with targets that were either just within reach 
of their arm or outside of arm’s reach. Participants were seated in front of 
a table into which small white circles were projected. When the circle dis-
appeared participants attempted to touch the location in which it had ap-
peared, either using their finger, or using a baton. Targets were estimated as 
closer when reaching with the baton than when reaching with the finger. 
However, a follow-up experiment showed that reachability only influenced 
distance estimates when it was relevant to action, namely when the per-
ceiver had previously formed an intention to reach, but not when merely 
holding the baton (Witt et al., 2005). 
Of particular importance is that studies of embodied perception redefine 
what might be considered an “accurate”, or “rational” response to the ques-
tions of “how far is it to get to a target location?” or “how steep is a hill?” On 
the one hand, if the hill is actually 5 degrees in incline, any deviation from 
5 degrees is incorrect. However, on the other hand, when wearing a backpack 
the hill becomes functionally steeper, and an answer of 20 degrees might in 
fact be the appropriate, although factually “irrational” or “incorrect” answer. 
Overall, studies on embodied perception suggest that even seemingly objec-
————— 
3 In contrast to the studies on hill slant, these studies involving distance esti-
mates only used “explicit” perceptual estimates in the form of participants giv-
ing estimates in feet and inches. No equivalent to the haptic measure was used. 
4 In these studies, as in studies involving hill slant described above, experi-
mental instructions to participants leave it ambiguous whether walking to the 
target (or climbing up the hill) would actually be required after making the 
perceptual estimates. However, underlying the notion of affordance is the as-
sumption that people automatically perceive the environment with regard to 
specific actions, without needing an explicit goal to perform such actions. 
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tive aspects of the physical environment, such as how far is it to get to a tar-
get, or how steep is an incline, are constrained by physical considerations of 
the body that perceives the environment. 
4.3. Direct evidence for the economy of action 
The economy of action account (Proffitt, 2006) maintains that spatial per-
ceptions depend on the resources necessary to perform actions relative to 
the resources that a person has available. What kind of resources are re-
quired to deal with challenges in the environment? At the most basic level, 
human beings, like all other animals, are living systems in which energy is 
necessary to maintain bodily functions such as respiration, digestion, blood 
circulation and to support any physical activity that goes beyond the resting 
state. Whenever energy is used, it must be replaced. Carbohydrates supply 
energy in the form or glucose, which becomes available throughout the 
body via the bloodstream. Although any physical action requires energy, 
the precise amount depends on the properties of the environment in which 
the action takes place. For instance, walking up a 5° hill requires much less 
energy than walking up a 20° hill. Similarly, walking up a hill while carry-
ing a heavy backpack requires more energy than when unencumbered. If 
the energetic requirements for an action are high or the available energy is 
low, then hills will appear steeper than they would otherwise, thereby dis-
couraging an individual from performing energetically suboptimal actions. 
The studies reviewed above involving visual slant and distance percep-
tion were built on the assumption of the economy of action. However, they 
did not experimentally manipulate or measure current energetic states of 
the perceiver. Furthermore, critics have objected that participants might 
have shown demand characteristics by indicating that the hill is steeper 
because they knew that they were wearing a backpack or were fatigued. 
In recent work, Schnall, Zadra and Proffitt (in press) directly manipu-
lated blood glucose levels, with the expectation that high blood glucose 
would make hills appear less steep relative to low blood glucose. Under the 
subterfuge of a taste testing study, participants were given a soft drink that, 
unbeknownst to them, was sweetened with either sugar, or with artificial 
sweetener. Thus, some participants were given readily available glucose, 
whereas the other participants were not. Then participants put on heavy 
backpacks while performing the same slant estimates as described above, 
including verbal, visual and haptic reports. Results from two experiments 
indicate that participants who had consumed a glucose-containing drink 
perceived the hill’s slant to be less steep than did participants who had con-
sumed a drink containing non-caloric sweetener. Because climbing a hill 
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while wearing a heavy backpack poses a metabolic challenge, explicit ac-
tion planning benefits from the apparent slant of the hill being influenced 
by one’s potential to expend energy. In contrast, visual processes involved 
in action execution, as measured by the haptic estimates, were unaffected 
by energetic factors, because the biomechanics of climbing a hill remain 
unchanged. Schnall et al. (2009) thus argue that a process that is relatively 
effortless and automatic, namely visual perception, is influenced by glucose 
levels because visual perception serves as the “fuel gauge” of whether glu-
cose is available or not, and what action in a given physical environment is 
possible. 
5. Embodied perception: Social and emotional factors 
In addition to the studies that investigated physiological resources, such as 
whether a person is rested or fatigued, has high or low levels of blood glu-
cose available, and so on, several studies have started looking into the in-
fluence of more psychological processes such as emotion and motivation.  
5.1. Emotion and perception of space 
Riener, Stefanucci, Proffitt and Clore (2003) tested the influence of mood 
on hill slant perception. Mood was induced by having participants listen to 
happy music or sad music, or by having participants write about happy or 
sad life events. Then participants completed slant estimates of a steep hill. 
Sad participants judged the hill as being steeper than those in the happy 
condition. As was found previously, the visually guided action measure 
was unaffected across conditions.  
Stefanucci and colleagues have explored the contribution of fear to var-
ious perceptual processes. Participants who stood at a skateboard (that was 
secured to be stationary) at the top of a hill and reported feeling afraid at 
the prospect of going down the hill perceived it to be steeper than partici-
pants who merely stood on a wooden box at the top of the hill (Stefanucci, 
Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008). Going beyond perceptual estimates of 
slant and extent, Stefanucci further developed a new perceptual paradigm 
by assessing people’s perception of height (Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2009). 
Participants estimated distance either when looking down from a balcony, 
or when looking up to the balcony. Vertical distance involving the balcony 
was generally overestimated relative to equivalent horizontal distance. Fur-
thermore, overestimation was particularly pronounced when looking down 
rather than when looking up, and when looking down from large height 
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rather than small height, presumably because of the potential danger and 
fear associated with standing exposed on a high balcony. This finding is 
consistent with earlier work involving hill slant that had shown that hills 
are perceived as steeper when viewed from the top relative to being viewed 
from the bottom once their incline makes them too difficult to descend, 
although it might still be possible to ascend (Proffitt et al., 1995). Further, 
individuals with pronounced fear of heights overestimate vertical distance 
from a two-story balcony more than those who do not suffer from fear of 
heights, thus suggesting that perceptual bias can be symptomatic of under-
lying emotional processes (Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, & Prof-
fitt, 2008). In addition to stable individual differences regarding fear of 
height, components of fear involving arousal have been manipulated exper-
imentally. Stefanucci and Storbeck (2009) first exposed half of their partic-
ipants to arousing visual images, while the other half of the participants 
were exposed to non-arousing visual images. Subsequent height estimates 
of a balcony were significantly higher for participants who previously had 
seen arousing stimuli, presumably because the arousal from the images 
intensified the fear associated with looking down from a high balcony. 
However, in contrast to such vertical distance estimates, high or low arous-
al did not have any influence on horizontal distance estimates, suggesting 
that arousal only has an impact when it is functionally relevant to the phys-
ical situation under consideration.  
Further, testing motivational influences, Balcetis and Dunning (2007) 
demonstrated that manipulations of cognitive dissonance changed the per-
ception of distance and slant. People in high choice conditions estimated 
slants to be less steep and distances to be less far than those in low choice 
or control conditions, presumably because they were keen to resolve disso-
nance. 
Such findings involving emotional and motivational factors might be 
considered intuitive from a social psychologist’s perspective; however, they 
are incompatible with most theories of perception that assume that percep-
tion constitutes a modular process that is independent from extraneous fac-
tors (Fodor, 1983; Marr, 1982). Instead, these findings are consistent with 
ecological approaches to perception (e.g., Gibson, 1979; Milner & Goodale, 
1995; Proffitt, 2006). 
5.2. Social resources and spatial perception 
Recent work has further explored whether other people might also be con-
sidered valuable resources in a manner that impacts spatial perception, and 
to some extent lead to effects parallel to the ones obtained on physiological 
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resources. Indeed, the basic finding that social support is a beneficial re-
source on many levels is well established. Apparently the number and in-
tensity of close social contacts serves as a buffer against life’s adverse 
events (Thoits, 1986) and thereby reduces the risk of stress-related illnesses 
such as heart disease (Seeman & Syme, 1987) and cancer (Fawzy et al., 
1993). Stress responses to threatening situations are dampened when a per-
son is in the presence of a supportive other compared to when being alone 
(Kamarck et al., 1990), and a similar attenuation of stress reactivity in the 
presence of conspecifics has been found even in non-human animals, in-
cluding rats (Davitz & Mason, 1955; Latané, 1969), guinea pigs (Hennes-
sey, O’Leary, Hawke, & Wilson, 2002) and monkeys (Gust, Gordon, Bro-
die, & McClure, 1994). Overall, social support appears to “lighten the load” 
of individuals who find themselves in stressful and challenging situations.  
If the presence of another person has such benefits, then the perception 
of challenging spatial environments such as steep hills might be modulated 
by the presence or absence of supportive others as well. Schnall, Stefa-
nucci, Clore and Proffitt conducted a pilot study to test whether simply 
verbally invoking a friend’s presence would have an effect on people’s 
distance estimates. Participants were graduate students of the Psychology 
Department at the University of Virginia which is housed in Gilmer Hall. 
They were asked to complete a two-item survey which they received by 
email, estimating the distance from Gilmer Hall to the following two loca-
tions: The downtown mall, a popular destination approximately 2.3 miles 
from Gilmer Hall, and Monticello, Thomas Jefferson’s former hill-top 
home, located about 5.8 miles from Gilmer Hall and involving an uphill 
journey. Half the participants were asked to imagine that they were stand-
ing in front of Gilmer Hall and needed to walk to the locations, and esti-
mate how far it was to get there. The other half of the participants, howev-
er, was asked to imagine that “you and a friend are standing in front of 
Gilmer Hall”, and needed to walk to the locations, and then give distance 
estimates. For the short, easily reachable location of the downtown mall 
mentioning the friend did not make any difference to distance estimate. For 
the more challenging, long distance to Monticello, however, participants 
who were asked to imagine walking with a friend found the distance to be 
significantly shorter than those who imagined walking alone. It seemed that 
when faced with a difficult situation, having to walk a long distance involv-
ing a steep hill, thinking of doing so while a friend was present made it 
seem less difficult. However, this was only preliminary evidence because it 
involved imagined or recalled distances, rather than actual spatial features 
of the environment that one is currently looking at.  
Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci and Proffitt (2008) followed up on this 
suggestive work with more controlled studies involving slant estimates of a 
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steep hill under conditions where social support was either present or ab-
sent. In the first study, participants stood at a steep hill while wearing a 
heavy backpack, and did so either alone, or with a friend standing at their 
side. Those who were with a friend, compared to those alone, perceived the 
hill as less steep. Thus, a psychosocial resource, social support, influenced 
apparent slant in much the same way as do energetic factors. Importantly, 
being with a friend versus being alone only affected measures related to 
explicit awareness and planning (verbal and visual estimates), and had no 
effect on the measure of visually guided action (haptic estimate). This pat-
tern was consistent with earlier findings on energetic resources and slant 
estimates that implicate two different visual systems (Bhalla & Proffitt, 
1999; Proffitt et al., 1995). A second study manipulated social support by 
having participants first mentally image a positive, neutral, or negative 
social contact, and then estimate the slant of the hill. Indeed, participants 
who thought of a positive other estimated the hill to be less steep than par-
ticipants who had either thought of a neutral or negative other. Again, dif-
ferences between experimental conditions were only found on the verbal 
and visual measures, which are related to explicit awareness, but not on the 
haptic measure, which is related to the visual control of action. Critically, in 
both studies the quality of the supportive relationship mediated the effect 
on visual perception. In Study 1, friendship duration was negatively corre-
lated with visual and verbal slant estimates: The longer a friend was known, 
the less steep the hill appeared. Further, in Study 2, the feelings of close-
ness to the imaged other were correlated to both the verbal and visual hill 
slop estimates: The closer participants felt toward their imaged social con-
tacts, the less steep the hill appeared to them. Thus, the critical ingredients 
that make relationships a powerful psychosocial resource explained why 
relationships moderate perception.  
The studies reviewed above illustrate how perceptions of space can 
change as a function of supportive others. However, whereas we like to be 
physically close to people who we feel emotionally “close” to, people pre-
fer to literally maintain a distance to strangers or generally, people who 
they are not “close” to. More specifically, people maintain an area of per-
sonal space around them, and are very sensitive to violations of this person-
al space (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Hall, 1968). Schnall, Witt, Stefanucci, 
Augustyn, Clore and Proffitt (2005) conducted a study modeled after field 
studies in naturalistic settings that involve an invasion of territory (e.g., 
Sommer, 1959). In contrast to those early studies that measured the per-
son’s behavioral response, we measured the person’s distance estimate to 
an object after their personal space was violated. In the invasion condition, 
participants’ space was invaded by an experimenter who casually placed a 
can of Coke from which she had been drinking immediately in front of 
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them (at a distance of about 10–45 cm). In the control condition, the exper-
imenter retrieved a fresh can of Coke from her briefcase, and placed it in 
front of the participant, with the words, “This is for you for participating.” 
Thus, the only difference between the two conditions was whether the ex-
perimenter had established ownership of the can (as indicated by drinking 
from it), and thus invaded the participant’s personal space, or the partici-
pant had ownership of the can (as indicated by the experimenter’s com-
ment). Then participants gave a matching estimate of the distance between 
the Coke can and the edge of the table where they were sitting. Results 
showed that participants whose space had been invaded estimated the ex-
perimenter’s can to be significantly closer than participants who had their 
own can within their personal space. Thus, when personal space was invad-
ed, another person’s object was experienced as “too close.”  
Several mechanisms for the observed effect are possible. First, the ef-
fect might be due to the fact that a social norm violation had taken place. 
Alternatively, it might be that an affective response was created, such as 
a feeling of disgust toward another person’s beverage. Future studies are 
aimed at differentiating between these possibilities. What is clear, however, 
is that the perceived distance to an identical object can change dramatically 
depending on social constructs such as object ownership. Thus, people ap-
pear to not only use space in specific ways as a function of social relation-
ships, but based on the results obtained in this study, also perceive space as 
a function of social relationships. It further appears that social processes are 
especially powerful in the action space within reach that has been termed 
personal space (Cutting & Vishton, 1995) because this space coincides to 
some extent with the personal space that has been extensively studied by 
social psychologists (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Hall, 1968).  
All of these studies – whether about physical resources or psychosocial 
resources – are based on the assumption that perceptual processes depend 
on a person’s resources in the context of navigating the environment. Thus, 
these studies were conducted from an embodied perspective, because the 
traditional cognitive model would not make different predictions for a per-
son standing in front of an actual hill, versus sitting at a computer and indi-
cating their response using keyboard presses.  
5.3. Subjective vs. objective judgments 
As noted earlier, a considerable body of research has demonstrated that 
subjective judgments of various kinds can be influenced by contextual fac-
tors (e.g., Clore et al., 2001). What makes perceptual judgments different, 
however, is the fact that they are concerned with objective judgments, 
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namely with features of the physical environment such as distances, hill 
slant or height, for which there is an objectively correct answer. In contrast 
to judgments of life satisfaction, risk, moral contempt, etc., there is an ob-
jective standard that indicates whether the judgment was correct or not. 
However, although perceptual judgments can be compared to an external 
standard, as demonstrated in the research reviewed in this chapter, they are 
nevertheless influenced by a variety of contextual factors relating to both 
physiological and social resources. Although it might not be that surprising 
that a hill appears steeper to a person who is wearing a heavy backpack, 
such a finding is inconsistent with traditional cognitive theories that view 
visual perception as a low-level process and is only predicted by theories 
that consider embodied factors within perception. What might be even 
more surprising, however, is that emotional factors can have a similar ef-
fect: A hill appears steeper for a person who is afraid because of standing 
on a skateboard at the top of a hill. Might this mean that being afraid is 
functionally similar to wearing a heavy backpack? Or if consuming a sug-
ary drink makes a hill look less steep, and being with a friend also makes 
a hill look less steep, does this mean that consuming energy in the form of 
sugar is functionally similar to being supported by a friend? At this point 
there is not sufficient empirical evidence to provide an answer of whether 
physiological and social resources might involve the same mechanism in 
terms of constraining perception of the physical space. However, all this 
work suggests that such factors are integral to the perceptual situation, and 
they need to be considered when trying to understand how people meta-
phorically and literally view the social and physical worlds.  
5.4. Spatial perception and spatial metaphors 
In their theory of conceptual metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) 
propose that concepts are represented in the form of metaphors that are 
grounded in basic experiences of how the body interacts with the physical 
world, for example, how people use resources, or how they move around in 
physical space. As a directly perceived, immediate concept, space can be 
used as a source of metaphors for various target domains. For instance, the 
spatial concept of verticality is used when describing positive or negative 
experiences, for example, when saying “We hit a peak last year, but it’s 
been downhill ever since.” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 17). Whereas early 
work on metaphor theory was conducted within linguistics and consisted of 
examples of metaphors and how they map onto physical experience, in re-
cent years social psychological studies have confirmed such connections 
empirically (e.g., Jostmann, Lakens & Schubert, 2009; Landau, Sullivan & 
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Greenberg, 2009; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schubert, 2005; Sherman & 
Clore, 2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008; Zhong, & Leonardelli, 2008). For 
example, Meier and Robinson (2004) showed that positive words were cat-
egorized more quickly when presented in the top half of a computer screen 
relative to the bottom half of the screen, whereas the opposite was the case 
for negative words. Such results suggest that conceptual structure might 
indeed be represented in a form that makes reference to physical space, for 
example, an upright posture when feeling happy, versus a slumped, “de-
pressed” posture when feeling sad.  
The results reviewed above in the context of embodied perception raise 
an additional possbility of the mutual influence of metaphor and physical 
space: If being with a friend takes a “load of your shoulders” and makes 
a steep hill appear less steep, then perhaps the metaphoric representation of 
friendship and its effect on challenges in life feeds back into how such chal-
lenges are literally perceived. The notion of social “support” might indeed 
mean that somebody is there for you to help with a difficult “load”, there-
fore decreasing the perceived slant of the hill. Similarly, when a target is 
“within reach” because a tool is available, it appears physically closer. 
Physical and metaphorical aspects of close vs. far experiences have recently 
been formalized within the framework of Construal Level Theory (see 
Liberman & Förster, this volume). Future studies will need to determine the 
extent to which physical and metaphorical space interact with one another.  
6. Summary 
Traditionally visual perception has been conceptualized as a low-level 
process that takes place in a “computationally encapsulated” manner (e.g., 
Fodor, 1983). Such approaches have assumed that visual perception is 
a modular process that is invariant to “higher-level” processes such as the 
perceiver’s goals or social context. However, two lines of recent research 
have challenged this assumption: First, studies involving maps and other 
conceptual representations of space, and second, studies involving the per-
ception of extent and slant, or in other words, of distances and inclines. 
Studies on mental maps suggest that people do not represent physical 
space in a veridical manner, but instead, distort it to be in line with func-
tional considerations, such as whether a map involves a border to another 
country, or some more abstract boundary. Further, based on Gibson’s 
(1979) notion of affordances, studies on the perception of physical space 
suggest that people perceive the world around them as a function of how 
they would act in that world: When their current bodily resources make it 
difficult in principle to, for example, cover a distance, or climb a hill, such 
150 Simone Schnall 
environments are perceived as challenging, with targets appearing far, and 
hills appearing steep. Although strictly speaking such perceptual processes 
do not accurately reflect the true geographic properties of space, in a func-
tional way, they are adaptive, because they influence individuals’ antici-
pated action. In other words, although a hill might objectively not be as 
steep as it looks when the observer wears a heavy backpack, the observer 
is nonetheless better off by either planning for a challenging ascent, or 
avoiding it altogether.  
In addition to physiological considerations recent research suggest that 
social and emotional resources might constrain the perception of physical 
space as well. For example, positive moods can make a hill appear less 
steep relative to negative moods such as sadness and fear. Further, having 
a friend nearby can literally and metaphorically provide “support” when 
ascending a steep hill. Such findings are consistent with recent approaches 
on embodied cognition, which are based on the premise that cognitive pro-
cesses follow from interactions of the person in the physical environment. 
As a consequence, distinctions of modular processes of cognition, percep-
tion and action become difficult to maintain; all these aspects of physical 
and psychological functioning are closely intertwined. Further, bodily met-
aphors might not only reflect perceptual experience of space, but might 
indeed feed back into those physical experiences themselves. 
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